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Problem Illustrated by Analysis of Agent's Tort Respon-
sibility to Third Persons as Outgrowth of Agent's Negli-
gent Performance or Failure in Duty to Principal.
A MASS of legal literature has congested around the foreseeability
concept. A host of writers' have pointed out that the foresee-
ability philosophy can be and has been expanded or contracted to suit
the courts particular attitude toward justice within the law. That such
is actually the situation cannot be denied and oftentimes should not be
too much deplored. It would not seem wise to object to the fact that
there is, as Professor Llewellyn puts it, "Enough leeway and give with-
in the framework of our law to allow of what is felt as justice being
attained in a case without departing from that framework.12 It does,
however, seem illogical that rules should be stated in such a manner as
to put emphasis upon the foreseeability approach when conclusions are
to be reached which totally ignore the "clear view" dogmas. It winl be
the thesis of this article to disclose that there are occasions when the
foreseeability rule should not be mentioned, and should, in fact, give
ground before other controlling principles. And, in addition, to indi-
cate that to focus attention upon foreseeability reasoning in those areas
where outcomes should rest upon other foundations has actually in-
duced some courts which abhor inconsistency to close their eyes entirely
as regards "forward looking" and come to wrong conclusions based
upon outworn concepts-which concepts, however, omit reference to
foreseeability and therefore permit evenness of decision.
To illustrate the basic proposition just set forth a problem has been
selected from the agency-tort field. Specifically, attention will be
directed to the agent's tort responsibility toward third persons in the
event he negligently performs or fails to perform a duty to his prin-
cipal. The majority rules which cover this field can be most accurately
and succinctly stated by referring to three sections of the Restatement
of Agency which provide as follows:
(a) "An agent who undertakes to act for the principal under
such conditions that some action is necessary for the pro-
*Professor of Law, Creighton University.
1 The authorities are too numerous to require citation. Perhaps Dean Leon
Green has been the most forceful exponent of the idea.
2 On Reading and Using The Newer Jurisprudence, 40 CoL. L. Rxv. 589 (1940).
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tection of the person of others or of their tangible things
is subject to liability to such others for physical harm to
them or to their things caused by his undertaking and sub-
sequent negligent failure to act, if the need for action is
so immediate or emergent that withdrawal from the un-
dertaking is no longer possible without unreasonable risk to
them, and the agent should so realize." 3
(b) "An agent who has the custody of land or chattels and who
should realize that there is an undue risk that their condi-
tion will cause harm to the person, land, or chattels of
others is subject to liability for such harm caused, during
the continuance of his custody, by his failure to use care
to take such reasonable precautions as he is authorized to
take."4
(c) "An agent who negligently performs or who fails to per-
form a duty to his principal is not thereby liable for harm
resulting to the pecuniary interests of a third person,
although the agent realizes that there is an unreasonable
risk that such harm will result."5
To make fully clear the fact that the law just cited places emphasis
upon the foreseeability approach it will be necessary to investigate the
cases where the courts have been operating within the indicated
philosophy.
The provisions of the first quoted section (a) have been relied
upon to justify recovery against a manager of a telephone company
who had the duty of inspecting poles when a pole in disrepair fell
upon the plaintiff in the street,6 to permit plaintiff injured by drinking
bad coca-cola to recover against the manager of the plant who had
supervised its manufacture,7 and to allow recovery by plaintiff who was
injured by the explosion of a boiler which defendant had agreed to
but failed to properly inspect.8 The provisions of the second quoted
section (b) have been relied upon to justify recovery by a business
guest against an agent in full charge of a building, with discretion as
to repairs, who knowing that a door was in bad condition failed to
repair it,9 by an employee against an agent in charge of a mine who
was authorized to, but failed to take precautions against explosion,1 0
by a performer against the manager of a theatre having control of
3 RESTATEMENT, AGENCY (1933) § 354.
4 RESTATEMENT, AGENCY (1933) § 355.
5 RESTATEmENT, AGENCY (1933) § 357.6 Murray v. Cowherd, 148 Ky. 591, 147 S.W. 6 (1912).
7 Bufkin v. Grisham, 128 So. 563 (Miss. 1930).8 Van Winkle v. Am. Steam Boiler Co., 52 N.J.L. 240, 19 Atl. 472 (1890).
9 Baird v. Shipman, 132 Ill. 16, 23 N.E. 384 (1890).10 Stiewal v. Bonnan, 63 Ark 30, 37 S.W. 404 (1896).
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its operation who failed to repair an unprotected switch,1' by an in-
vitee against an agent in charge of an apartment house for failing to
repair a catch on the door of an elevator,12 by a tenant against an
agent in charge of a house for permitting a large hole to remain in the
walk, 3 by a plaintiff who was cut by glass which fell out of a window
when it was found that the defendant, administrator in charge of
an estate, had failed to inspect the building from which the glass fell,'14
by a passerby who was injured by the fall of a roof when defendant
agent who was in control of the management of the property, including
its improvement and repair, had failed to perform his duties, 5 by the
owner of property against a section boss who did not perform his duty
of keeping weeds from the track when the weeds were set afire by an
engine and the fire burned plaintiff's property,16 by a tenant against
the executive committee of a university having supervision of an office
building for injury due to its known defective condition, 7 and by many
others under comparable circumstances.' 8
An analysis of the above illustrative cases leads to the logical and
inevitable conclusion that the courts have been swayed by the foresee-
ability test. It is apparent that the courts are basing their decisions upon
the responsibility of the agent as a reasonably prudent man. The agent
has not shouldered extra burdens simply because he is a man who has
made a contract with his principal. Rather Ify reason of having accepted
employment the agent has assumed certain responsibilities and duties.
He has done so because he is a reasonably prudent man operating in
his particular sphere of circumstances. When, for instance, the factual
picture reveals that a man has promised his principal that he will make
repairs or carefully inspect, he can foresee that he has prevented third
parties from getting such protection directly from the principal and
that damage may be caused if he does not live up to his word or if he
negligently acts in respect to his work. In such surroundings justice
dictates that we do not allow the agent to throw prudence to the wind
and renege on his clearly distinguishable responsibilities.
Such a conception and outlook, when understood and analyzed in
connection with the third section (c) quoted from the Restatement of
Agency, 20 contains the germ of explosive possibilities. For once it is
11 Rising v. Ferris, 216 I1. App. 252 (1919).
12Tippecanoe L. and T. Co. v. Jester, 180 Ind. 357, 101 N.E. 915 (1913).
Is Carson v. Quinn, 127 Mo. App. 525, 105 S.W. 1088 (1907). ,
14 Bannigan v. Woodbury, 158 Mich. 206, 122 N.W. 531 (1909).
35 Mollino v. Ogden and Clarkson Corp., 243 N.Y. 450, 154 N.E. 307 (1926).
18 Carter v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry. Co., 84 S.C. 546, 66 S.E. 997 (1908).
'7 Gamble v. Vanderbilt U., 138 Tenn. 616, 200 S.W. 510 (1917).
18 See note, 16 ORE. L. REv. 175 (1937).
19 Comment (b), § 357, RESTATEMENT, AGENCY (1933) substantiates such a view-
point.
20 RESTATEMENT, AGENCY (1933) §357.
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admitted, as it apparently has to be, that the language of Section
357 of the Restatement (Section c, supra) is worded from a foresee-
ability approach, and that as regards duties to third parties, the agent
often takes on the responsibilities of the average prudent man, it seems
to this writer that one must inevitably question a rule which absolves
from liability an agent who can realize that there is an unreasonable
and clearly discernible risk of pecuniary loss to third persons whenever
he negligently fails to perform a certain type of duty to his principal
Specifically, it seems strange that magic should be attached to the
phrase "pecuniary loss" and that surveyors,21 attorneys,22 abstractors,2
3
collectors of taxes who give erroneous receipts, 24 accountants,25 and
recorders,28 should not be accountable to third persons who rely upon
their various negligently prepared reports simply because the third per-
son has suffered nothing but pecuniary loss. The way the rule now
stands, as set forth by the authors of the Restatement of Agency,
2 7
with its emphasis upon non-liability "although the agent realizes that
there is an unreasonable risk that such harm will result," it appears that
if the outcome is only pecuniary loss to the third party the agent does
not have to act as the reasonably prudent man .2 In short it looks as if
the phraseology of the rule succeeds in revealing to us a rare, almost
freakish character-an agent without reasonable man responsibilities.
It is, of course, true that many of the courts which hold for non-
liability when only financial loss has resulted, avoid any mention of the
effect of pecuniary loss in handing down their decisions. Many of the
tribunals rest the outcome upon the fact that there was no privity
between the parties. The fact, however, that many of the same courts
disregard the privity rule when another type of loss accrues indicates
that they are influenced by the magic attached to the monetary loss
fact.
21 Le Lieve v. Gould, L. R. 1 Q. B. D. 491 (1893).
22 Savings Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195 (1879) ; Dundee Mtg. and Trust Co. v.
Hughes, 20 Fed. 39 (1884).2 3 Talpey v. Wright, 61 Ark. 275, 32 S.W. 1072 (1895) ; Symns v. Cutter, 9 Kan.
App. 210 (1900); Schade v. Gehner, 133 Mo. 252, 34 S.W. 576 (1896); Equi-
table B. and L. Ass'n. v. Bank, 118 Tenn. 678, 102 S.W. 901 (1907).24 Kahl v. Love, 37 N.J.L. 5 (1874).25 Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931); Landell v.
Lybrand, 264 Pa. St. 406, 107 Atl. 783 (1919). Also see note, 24 VA. L. REv.
331 (1938).2 6 Houseman v. Girard M. B. L. Ass'n., 81 Pa. St. 256 (1876).
2 7 REsTATEMENT, AGENCY (1933) § 357.
28 It is true that in some of the cases cited supra, notes 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, and 26
the court treated the matter as if the agent would never have suspected that
the report would be shown to third parties. It seems that such an attitude is
not realistic. But, even if the court's view is accepted, it remains that the rule
is as stated in § 357 of the Restatement of Agency, and the agent is clearly
privileged to act in a manner different from that of the reasonably prudent
man.
1941]
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Therefore, since the "pecuniary loss" rule can be established as an
important, even if background, tool for framing results, it seems appro-
priate and the time to come back to the very heart of the thesis of this
article, and to point out that the very presence of the "financial loss"
rule, with its roots firmly imbedded in a foreseeability atmosphere,
seems to be the cause for legal literature and cases in the field under
discussion often continuing to be occupied to a large extent with the
question as to whether there was a nonfeasance or misfeasance or
whether the absence of privity between agent and third party should
result in non-liability. For such does continue to be the situation even
though some courts have heeded the modern rationalization of Tort
law and are no longer primarily concerned with the older distinctions
and the question whether the event which caused the harm was an act
or a failure to act,2 9 and even though they have rejected the medieval
conception of the necessity of privity between the parties.30
Consequently, even though it can be demonstrated 3l that many
courts reject the privity concept when the agent's act brings about
damage to a person or property, it is still true, as the authors of the
Restatement put it,3 2 that remnants of the earlier rules exist to such an
extent "that the courts' path to a complete rationalization and harmoni-
zation of the whole field has many detours."33 In other words as much
day by day litigation occurs in this corner of jurisprudence as in almost
any other.
It is not unrealistic to suppose that all the confusion is brought
about because many courts have noted the attention paid to foresee-
ability in stating the rules, and have refused to see any essential dis-
tinction between damage to person, property, or pocket-book. Viewing
the matter from such a perspective, it is not surprising to find some
courts refusing to draw lines and settling the matter under privity
doctrines.
For fear that the reader will arrive at a wrong deduction from what
has already been written, it seems necessary to make pointedly clear
that the writer of this article is not criticizing the non-liability results
arrived at through application of the "financial loss" rule. It may be
that the advance in Tort law should bring about another conclusion.
It is not, however, the purpose of this discussion to go into such matter.
The only goal at this time is to raise questions about a rule which puts
29Tentative Draft, No. 6 RESTATEMENT, AGENCY, 198 (1931).30 Supra note 29, at 199. The proposition is so firmly established as not to require
the citation of authority.
r' Supra, notes 6 to 18 inclusive.
32 Supra, note 29 at 199.
33Minnis v. Younker Bros., 118 N.W. 532 (Ia. 1908); Wendland v. Berg, 188
Ia. 202, 174 N.W. 410 (1920) ; Mauer v. Egan, 182 N.Y.S. 180 (1920) ; Kelly v.
Chicago and A. Ry. Co., 122 Fed. 286 (1903) ; Burrechter v. Chicago M. & St.
P. Ry. Co., 10 F. (2d) 165 (1925); Potter v. Gilbert, 115 N.Y.S. 425 (1909).
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such emphasis upon foreseeability that consistent courts are impelled
to evade the whole issue of agent's responsibility by falling back on
archaic principles.
As early as 1916 clear and brilliant thinkers saw the inconsistency
concealed within the phraseology of the "pecuniary loss" dogma. It was
in that year that Professor Warren A. Seavey writing on the "Liability
of An Agent in Tort"3 4 pointed out that the result of non-liability under
the above indicated doctrine was placed on grounds of remoteness and
justified by analogy with some non-agency cases in the tort field. He
pointed out that many of the courts were wrong in their decisions in
the tort cases, but remarked that "accepting their reasoning as sound
it will not apply to the agency cases, where, since the agent knew the
nature of the injury to be suffered and the one3" to be injured, it can-
not be said the result was too remote." Then, a few paragraphs later,
Professor Seavey remarked, "The language in none of these cases is
very convincing and should not be an obstacle to a court which is will-
ing to do more than repeat the formula that for failure to act an agent
is liable only to his principal." Again in 1931 the Reporters of the
Restatement of Agency 38 in their explanatory notes set forth in the
Tentative Draft37 refer to the "pecuniary loss" rule and state, "This
section is another on which the Agency group has considerable doubt
as to its correctness. 3 8
In spite, however, of such an utterance the rule was finally adopted
by the Restatement.39 A question, therefore, naturally comes to the
front. Why was the doctrine ultimately approved when so much doubt
existed as to its correctness and when it was apparently so contrary to
natural logic? The answer to the question will once again focus atten-
tion upon the very core of the thesis upon which this discussion rests.
It is submitted that perhaps the Reporters were swayed by the feeling
that the result was to be desired, but were painfully conscious of the
inconsistency involved in disregarding the foreseeability wording of the
rule.
The writer is, of course, aware of the reason given by the Reporters
-namely that they felt duty bound to state the law as it exists. But the
Reporters have not always felt so duty bound to dogmas. Hence, is it
fanciful to suspect that until Tort law definitely reaches out to impose
new forms of liability, the Reporters are satisfied with the results
34 1 So. L. Q. 39 (1916).
35 Professor Seavey's latest utterances (note 37, infra) would seem to indicate
that he would not wish to have the word "one" carry a restricted connotation.
He seems willing to allow it to remind of "class."
36 Professor Seavey was the Chief Reporter.
3 6 Tentative Draft 202 (1931).
38 The same thought is forcibly put in a note in 21 MiNN. L. REV. 441 (1937).
There it is said, "Finding that there is no duty is incompatible with the thesis
that the duty is premised on the foreseeability of injury."
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reached under Section 357? Is it not realistic to suppose that their
quarrel with the rule is a hedging technique to protect themselves
against the charge of inconsistency?
As already remarked, the writer raises no objection to the results
reached under the rule. He merely deplores the statement of rules
which put emphasis upon foreseeability in situations where conclusions
are to be reached which totally ignore the "clear view" reasoning, and
he deplores the unevenness of the law which seems to be the direct out-
growth of such approval.
Professor Fred Rodell in his Woe Unto You, Lawyers has a lot to
say which can be challenged. But the thought comes to mind that some
of Professor Rodell's reasoning is valid. It does appear that at times
American jurisprudes have been guilty of indirect statement of the
law with harmful results. If non-liability is to be the rule in the "finan-
cial loss" area, it can be provided for under a rule which would not
encourage courts to hide behind outworn principles in order to avoid
inconsistency. All that is necessary is to rephrase the philosophy by
removing the emphasis from the concept of "clear view."
Justice Cardozo pointed the way in the now famous Ultramares
Corporation v. Touche40 case. In commenting upon the liability of an
accountant to a third person for negligence the great New York jurist
significantly remarked, "If liability for negligence exists, a thoughtless
slip or blunder ... may expose accountants to a liability in an indeter-
minate amount.. . The hazards of a business conducted on these terms
are so extreme as to enkindle doubt whether a flaw may not exist in
the implication of a duty that exposes to these consequences." The same
thought, although not nearly so forcefully, was expressed by the Kan-
sas court in Mallory v. Ferguson.41
If Cardozo's reasoning is accepted, emphasis would be taken off the
"pecuniary loss" fact with its unfortunate attendant stress on foresee-
ability. Instead, the courts' attention would be directed to the fact that
in fields involving high degrees of mental skill, where a slip is always
possible, the performer should not be liable to others beyond those
with whom he made the contract. The foreseeability element would
be subordinated. A defendant would escape liability even though he
could foresee results if a mental slip should cause a mistake. He would
be extended immunity because the courts could realize that even a
skillful man, using a high degree of care, might make a mental error.
Of course, if the facts indicated that the mistake was based upon wilful
and wanton misconduct rather than a mere mental blunder, it would
seem necessary to qualify the rule. Certainly, a statement of philosophy
39 RESTATEMENT, AGENCY (1933) § 357.
40255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931).
4150 Kan. 685, 32 Pac. 410 (1893).
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could take cognizance of such possible change in foundation back-
ground. At any rate there does seem to be a difference in the serious-
ness of the negligence involved in the acts of inspecting or repairing
and the acts of abstracting or auditing. The man who fails to or care-
lessly inspects or repairs is probably more culpable than the man who
momentarily loses his way in solving a technical mental problem. It
may, of course, be said that the accountant or abstractor should assume,
as a risk of doing business, liability to third parties. Until, however,
Tort law makes such an advance it seems that the courts desire to feel
otherwise.
Consequently, a statement of the rule, which puts stress on non-
liability because of the lessened responsibility growing out of a mental
mistake, will, it is submitted, lead to doing away with much of the con-
fusion which exists. On the one hand, it will permit all courts to depart
from the hedging device of the privity concept and find liability in the
repair and inspecting situations. On the other hand, it will allow courts
to find non-liability in the auditing and abstracting areas. Both conclu-
sions can be arrived at without illogically manipulating the foresee-
ability rule.
CONCLUSION
It is hoped that this discussion has succeeded in focusing attention
upon the fact that great care should be used in formulating rules.
Principles should be stated in such lucid terms and in such a direct
manner as to insure that their acceptance will not involve an illogical
justification for liability or non-liability. The rather obvious illustration
used in this discussion for the purpose of bringing out the point does
not stand alone. There is a great deal of muddy thinking, based upon
the slenderest sort of reasoning, which arises as a direct result of an
improper emphasis on some slogan. This very situation, for instance,
is responsible for the confusion in the emotional disturbance field.42
The distinguishing earmark of a good statement of legal philosophy
should be its success in steering courts away from friction with just
and established concepts. The problem and solution suggested in this
article was intended to illustrate how such matters can be accomplished.
The practical repercussion from such technique should be more uni-
formity of decision, and the triumph of the idea of justness rather
than the emergence of an exception which seems to fly in the very face
of an accepted doctrine.
42 For a discussion on the point and a rather complete citatiqn of authorities see
.the author's articles on Duty and Foreseeability Factors in Fright Cases, 23
MARQ. L. R.v. 103 (1939), and Insults-Practical Jokes-Threats of Future
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